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Abstract	
Procedural	 environmental	 justice	 refers	 to	 fairness	 in	 processes	 of	 decision‐making.	 It	
recognises	 that	 environmental	 victimisation,	while	 an	 injustice	 in	 and	 of	 itself,	 is	 usually	
underpinned	by	unjust	deliberation	procedures.	Although	green	criminology	tends	to	focus	
on	 the	 former—distributional	 dimension	 of	 environmental	 justice—this	 article	 draws	
attention	 to	 its	 procedural	 counterpart.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 notions	 of	
justice‐as‐recognition	 and	 justice‐as‐participation	 are	 jointly	 manifested	 within	 its	
conceptual	 boundaries.	 This	 is	 done	 by	 using	 the	 consultation	 process	 that	 occurs	 with	
indigenous	peoples	on	proposed	oil	 sands	projects	 in	Northern	Alberta,	Canada,	as	a	case	
study.	Drawing	from	‘elite’	interviews,	the	article	illustrates	how	indigenous	voices	have	been	
marginalised	and	their	Treaty	rights	misrecognised	within	this	consultation	process.	As	such,	
in	seeking	to	understand	the	procedural	determinants	of	distributional	injustice,	the	article	
aims	to	encourage	broader	green	criminological	scholarship	to	do	the	same.		
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Introduction		
Procedural	environmental	justice	refers	to	fairness	in	processes	of	decision‐making.	Recognising	
the	 difficulties	 involved	 in	 unilaterally	 specifying	 fairness	 in	 outcomes	 in	 relation	 to	
environmental	issues,	this	form	of	justice	advocates	widespread	democratisation	of	deliberation	
procedures.		
	
The	purpose	of	this	article	is	to	explore	how	justice‐as‐recognition	and	justice‐as‐participation	
are	 jointly	manifested	within	the	concept	of	procedural	environmental	 justice.	 In	using	this	 to	
examine	 the	 process	 of	 First	 Nation	 consultation	 in	 the	 Canadian	 Oil	 Sands,	 the	 article	 also	
demonstrates	how	the	conception	 translates	 into	concrete	application.	The	 impetus	 for	 this	 is	
twofold.	First,	while	green	criminologists	have	 ‘devoted	most	of	their	attention	to	 illuminating	
and	describing	different	types	of	environmental	harm’	(Brisman	2014:	2,	emphasis	in	original),	it	
is	not	enough	to	focus	on	consequences	alone	if	an	explanation	for	victimisation	is	being	sought.	
Instead,	this	requires	an	understanding	of	 ‘who	has	the	power	to	make	decisions,	the	kinds	of	
decisions	that	are	made,	 in	whose	interests	 they	are	made,	and	how	social	practices	based	on	
these	decisions	are	materially	organised’	(White	2008:	56).	The	challenge,	therefore,	is	to	identify	
the	 procedural	 determinants	 of	 environmental	 harm	 and	 examine	 the	 reasons	 for	 their	
victimogenic	operation.	
	
Second,	existing	explanations	for	ecological	disorganisation	in	the	Canadian	Oil	Sands	prioritise	
macro	 level	 analyses.	 Harm	 is	 explained	 by	 the	 expansionary	 tendencies	 of	 global	 capitalism	
(Lynch,	Long	and	Stretesky	2016),	the	predatory	influences	of	the	North	American	Free	Trade	
Agreement	 (Smandych	 and	 Kueneman	 2010),	 or	 contemporary	 structures	 inherent	 to	 the	
Canadian	settler‐colonial	state	(Huseman	and	Short	2012).	While	insightful,	these	accounts	focus	
primarily	 on	 international	 and	 national	 political	 and	 economic	 pressures,	 suggesting	 that	
overarching	 state	 and	 corporate	 power	 proceeds	 uninhibited	 on	 its	 way	 to	 unilaterally	
industrialising	the	oil	sands	resource.	This	disguises	the	central	role	of	provincial	government	
apparatus	in	sanctioning	extractives	activity	and	obscures	repeated	attempts	by	local	indigenous	
peoples,	or	First	Nations,	to	oppose	it	through	the	regulatory	consultation	process.	As	a	result,	
there	is	very	little	information	on	how	constitutionally	protected	Treaty	rights	of	First	Nations—
to	hunt,	fish	and	trap	on	the	land	and	be	consulted	on	any	activity	that	may	adversely	affect	their	
ability	to	do	so—have	been	circumvented	in	the	process	of	sanctioning	oil	sands	expansion.	Here,	
this	shortcoming	is	addressed.		
	
This	article	is	in	four	sections.	The	first	outlines	procedural	environmental	justice	as	a	concept.	It	
does	 this	 by	highlighting	 the	 limits	 inherent	 to	 the	dominant,	 distributive‐focused	 conception	
used	within	green	criminology	for	over	two	decades.	This	includes	discussion	of	how	justice‐as‐
recognition	and	justice‐as‐participation	can	complement,	not	replace,	this	concept	and	provide	
an	approach	for	evaluating	decision‐making	processes	underpinning	distributional	injustice.	The	
second	section	presents	an	overview	of	the	oil	sands	and	First	Nation	Treaty	rights,	followed	by	
an	explanation	of	how	they	manifest	within	the	regulatory	process	governing	oil	sands	expansion.	
The	third	section	outlines	the	methods,	findings	and	analysis	of	 interview	data,	with	a	specific	
focus	on	aspects	of	consultation	towards	which	participants	directed	criticism.	In	the	final	section,	
the	article	discusses	the	findings	in	the	context	of	procedural	environmental	justice,	illustrating	
how	 the	 recursive	 relationship	 between	 institutionalised	 marginalisation	 and	misrecognition	
acts	to	produce	distributional	injustice	for	First	Nations.		
	
Procedural	environmental	justice	
Over	a	decade	ago,	Zilney	et	al.	 (2006:	47)	highlighted	 the	 ‘dearth	of	 criminological	attention’	
being	directed	at	issues	of	environmental	justice.	Almost	ten	years	later,	a	review	of	the	green	
criminological	literature	described	its	contribution	to	environmental	justice	research	as	‘modest	
at	 best’	 (Lynch,	 Stretesky	 and	 Long	 2015:	 5).	 Effort	 has	 been	 made	 to	 redirect	 green	
criminological	study	towards	under‐acknowledged	aspects	of	environmental	justice,	including	its	
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ties	 to	 social	 justice	 (Davies	 2017),	 ecology	 (White	 2007),	 and	 political	 economy	 and	 social	
movements	 (Lynch	 et	 al.	 2015).	 However,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 the	 sub‐field	 has	 relied	 on	 a	
conception	 that	 focuses	 almost	 entirely	 on	 unequal	 distributions	 of	 harm	 along	 the	 lines	 of	
gender,	class	and	ethnicity.	This	is	evidenced	by	empirical	work	conducted	by	a	relatively	small	
group	 of	 scholars.	 These	 have	 explored	 the	 intersection	 of	 socio‐economic	 conditions	 and	
environmental	hazards	among	American	indigenous	communities	(Lynch	and	Stretesky	2012),	
pesticide	exposure	experienced	by	migrant	workers	in	relation	to	the	citing	of	waste‐to‐energy	
facilities	(Lynch	and	Stretesky	1998),	the	proximity	of	public	schools	to	environmental	hazards	
(Stretesky	 and	 Lynch	 2002),	 and	 the	 relationships	 between	 relatively	 poor,	 minority	
communities	and	the	situating	of	coal‐fired	power	stations	(Kosmicki	and	Long	2016).	Ultimately,	
the	 overwhelming	 concern	 has	 been	 on	 distributional	 injustice.	 This	 stems	 from	 three	
consecutive	 decades	 of	 criminological	 thought,	 which	 has	 conceived	 of	 environmental	 justice	
almost	uniformly	as:		
	
[T]he	geographical	association	between	race,	ethnicity,	economic	indicators,	and	
areas	that	contain	hazardous	substances…	.	(Stretesky	and	Hogan	1998:	269)	
	
[T]he	distribution	of	environments	among	peoples	in	terms	of	access	to	and	use	of	
specific	 natural	 resources	 in	 defined	 geographical	 areas,	 and	 the	 impacts	 of	
particular	social	hazards	and	environmental	hazards	on	specific	populations	(e.g.	
as	defined	on	the	basis	of	class,	occupation,	gender,	age,	ethnicity).	(White	2007:	
37)	
	
[T]he	 unequal	 distribution	 of	 pollution	 and	 variability	 in	 the	 social	 control	 of	
pollution	across	communities	with	varying	racial,	ethnic	and	class	compositions.	
(Lynch	et	al.	2015:	2)	
	
Although	giving	priority	to	the	‘fundamental	question’	of	all	justice	theory	(Brighouse	2004:	2)	
and	 illustrating	 the	 scale	 and	 scope	 of	 environmental	 issues	 at	 hand,	 purely	 distributive	
paradigms	such	as	this	‘tend	to	ignore	the	institutional	contexts	that	influence	or	determine	the	
distributions’	(Schrader‐Frachette	2002:	27).	This	cannot	be	said	to	characterise	the	sub‐field	as	
a	whole,	however,	as	much	green	criminological	work	does	focus	on	drawing	out	these	influences.	
For	instance,	deficits	in	democracy	have	been	found	to	contribute	to	socio‐environmental	conflict	
over	mining	in	Argentina	(Weinstock	2017),	while	the	commercialisation	of	nature	across	Latin	
America	is	facilitated	by	a	web	of	legal	and	illegal	injustices	(Goyes	and	South	2017).	Similarly,	
the	 absence	 of	 citizen	 participation	 in	 decision‐making	 is	 implicated	 in	 long‐standing,	 violent	
conflicts	 over	 land	 use	 in	 Colombia	 (Goyes	 and	 South	 2016).	 Various	 aspects	 of	 procedural	
injustice	are	clearly	recognisable	in	such	accounts,	but	as	the	concept	is	not	deployed	as	a	specific	
lens	 through	 which	 to	 conduct	 analysis	 its	 conceptual	 contours	 are	 only	 ever	 implied.	
Consequently,	 despite	 its	 presence	 throughout	 green	 criminological	 literature,	 the	 concept	 of	
procedural	environmental	 justice	has	rarely	been	subject	to	direct	theoretical	development	or	
empirical	exploration.	
	
An	exception	to	this	can	be	found	in	White	(2013),	where	environmental	justice	is	described	as	
multi‐dimensional.	 This	 ‘trivalent’	 conceptualisation	 is	 more	 prevalent	 outside	 of	 green	
criminology,	where	 the	 literature	has	 long	 incorporated	 the	concepts	of	 justice‐as‐recognition	
and	 procedural	 justice	 alongside	 that	 of	 distribution	 (Walker	 2012).	 Although	 conceptually	
distinct,	the	integration	of	this	trio	acknowledges	that	unequal	exposure	to	environmental	harm	
tends	 to	 stem	 from	 unequal	 access	 to	 decision‐making	 processes.	 This	 is	why,	 in	 reality,	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 three	 forms	 of	 justice	 are	 ‘played	 out	 in	 the	 procedural	 realm’	
(Schlosberg	 2007:	 26).	 Patterns	 of	 injustice‐as‐equity	 and	 injustice‐as‐misrecognition	 both	
impede	participation	and	vice	versa,	meaning	that	the	procedural	dimension	gains	priority	as	the	
space	in	which	distributional	justice	is	either	ensured	or	inhibited.	It	is	in	this	context	that	specific	
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qualities	of	recognition	and	participation	can	be	distilled	to	permit	an	assessment	of	procedural	
environmental	justice.		
	
The	notion	of	procedural	justice	can	be	defined	as	the	‘fair	and	equitable	institutional	processes	
of	a	state’	 (Schlosberg	2007:	25).	These	may	encompass	state	practices	 in	 relation	 to	 law	and	
regulation	 or,	 given	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 state	 functions	 under	 neoliberalism,	 implicate	
institutional	settings	and	actors	from	the	private	or	third	sectors	(see	Walker	2012).	Whichever	
is	under	examination,	procedural	justice	recognises	that	a	deliberation	process	may	be	conceived	
as	unfair	in	and	of	itself,	irrespective	of	the	distributive	inequities	that	may	result.	Having	roots	
in	the	literature	on	public	engagement,	the	operational	features	of	this	dimension	can	be	traced	
back	to	Arnstein’s	(1969)	pioneering	‘ladder	of	citizen	participation’.	Referring	to	a	spectrum	of	
participatory	 categories,	 these	 range	 from	 ‘non‐participation’,	 where	 people	 are	 effectively	
excluded	from	the	decision‐making	process,	through	to	 ‘citizen	power’,	where	members	of	the	
public	exert	some	control	over	the	decisions	made.	For	Arnstein	(1969:	216),	facilitating	these	
latter	stages	of	engagement	is	key	because	they	represent	a	fairer	process:	
	
[P]articipation	 without	 redistribution	 of	 power	 is	 an	 empty	 and	 frustrating	
process	for	the	powerless.	It	allows	the	power‐holders	to	claim	that	all	sides	were	
considered,	but	makes	it	possible	for	only	some	of	those	sides	to	benefit.		
	
Subsequent	conceptions	have	modified	Arnstein’s	ladder	in	various	ways,	moving	from	Dorcey	et	
al.’s	 (1994)	 ladder	 of	 ‘informing’	 to	 ‘ongoing	 involvement’,	 through	 Silverman’s	 (2005:	 37)	
continuum	between	‘grassroots’	participation	and	‘instrumental’	engagement,	and	on	to	Tritter	
and	McCallum’s	(2006)	multiple	ladders	model.	Yet,	irrespective	of	their	variances,	all	maintain	
an	emphasis	on	facilitating	meaningful,	or	influential,	citizen	engagement	in	decision‐making	at	
multiple	 stages.	 Accordingly,	 for	 participation	 within	 a	 procedure	 to	 be	 deemed	 just,	 all	
participants	 should	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 be	 listened	 to	 and	 to	 be	 heard,	 to	 have	 their	
contributions	respected,	valued	and	considered,	and	to	have	a	chance	to	determine	the	scope	of	
issues	to	be	reviewed	(George	and	Reed	2017).	This	latter	aspect	is	particularly	important	as	it	
addresses	the	question	of	which	environmental	problems	are	to	be	produced	in	the	first	place.		
	
The	 notion	 of	 justice‐as‐recognition	 intersects	 substantially	 with	 its	 procedural	 counterpart,	
largely	because	‘if	you	are	not	recognized,	you	do	not	participate;	if	you	do	not	participate,	you	
are	 not	 recognized’	 (Schlosberg	 2007:	 26).	 Rooted	 in	 Fraser’s	 (1996;	 see	 also	 Young	 1990)	
broadly	applicable	concept	of	 ‘participatory	parity’,	 justice‐as‐recognition	requires	 individuals	
within	a	group	to	be	considered	full	members	in	a	social	interaction.	Under	this	conception,	un‐,	
mis‐	or	mal‐recognition	may	take	the	form	of	‘cultural	domination’,	of	being	forced	to	adhere	to	
the	culture	of	another,	‘non‐recognition’,	which	is	akin	to	being	rendered	invisible,	or	‘disrespect’,	
which	refers	to	routine	disparagement	(Fraser	1999:	32).	These	are	unjust	in	and	of	themselves	
because	they	serve	to	devalue	and	demean	by	preventing	individuals	from	being	treated	on	par	
with	others	 in	society.	 In	this	sense,	 if	applying	the	concept	to	decision‐making	processes,	 the	
standards	to	be	attained	are	inclusivity,	respectfulness	and	equality	(see	Hunold	and	Young	1998;	
Schrader‐Frachette	 2002).	 The	 exact	 manifestation	 of	 these	 may	 differ	 by	 institution,	 but	
participation	 should	 involve	 access	 for	 a	 diversity	 of	 stakeholders	 at	 different	 stages	 of	
deliberation,	transparent	and	accountable	communication	structures,	and	special	consideration	
or	accommodation	for	adversely	affected	and	previously	marginalised	groups	(George	and	Reed	
2017).		
	
Conceiving	of	procedural	environmental	justice	in	this	way,	as	a	site	in	which	questions	of	justice‐
as‐recognition	and	justice‐as‐participation	converge,	draws	attention	to	the	ways	in	which	prior	
injustices	 contribute	 to	 inequitable	 distributions	 of	 harm.	 It	 also	 provides	 a	more	 ‘complete’	
framework	for	analysis	when	compared	to	the	relatively	one‐dimensional	conception	dominating	
green	criminological	scholarship	(Schlosberg	2007:	40).	To	demonstrate	how	this	can	be	applied	
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in	 reality,	 the	 article	now	 turns	 to	 the	 consultation	process	 that	 occurs	with	 First	Nations	on	
prospective	extraction	projects	in	the	Canadian	Oil	Sands.		
	
The	case	in	focus:	First	Nation	consultation	on	oil	sands	projects	
Following	confederation	in	1867,	the	Government	of	Canada	signed	11	Numbered	Treaties	with	
various	 indigenous	peoples	across	the	breadth	of	Canada’s	 landmass.	These	were	the	primary	
means	through	which	title	to	substantial	tracts	of	indigenous	land	were	exchanged	for	formally	
acknowledged	 ‘reserve’	 areas,	 hunting,	 fishing	 and	 trapping	 rights,	 and	 guarantees	 that	
indigenous	peoples	would	adhere	to	Crown	laws	and	customs.	Such	imperatives	underpinned	the	
signing	of	Treaty	8	in	1899,	which	covers	most	of	the	oil	sands	deposit	in	Northern	Alberta.	With	
the	energy	potential	of	bitumen	 largely	unrecognised	at	 this	point,	 the	over‐riding	purpose	of	
Treaty	8	was	to	extinguish	Aboriginal	Title	to	840,000	square	kilometres	of	land	in	order	to	open	
up	the	area	for	settlement,	mining	and	passage	northwards	after	gold	was	found	in	the	Yukon	
(Fumoleau	2004).		
	
The	ancestors	of	present‐day	First	Nations	would	not	agree	to	the	terms	of	Treaty	8	unless	their	
hunting,	 fishing	 and	 trapping	 practices	 were	 protected	 on	 said	 ‘surrendered’	 land.	 As	 Sifton	
(quoted	in	Government	of	Canada	1899)	made	clear	in	the	Report	of	Commissioners	for	Treaty	No.	
8,	‘we	had	to	solemnly	assure	them	that	…	they	would	be	as	free	to	hunt	and	fish	after	the	treaty	
as	they	would	be	if	they	never	entered	into	it’.	Yet,	accompanying	these	promises	was	a	‘lands	
taken	up	provision’	where,	in	exchange	for	these	protections,	the	Government	of	Canada	(1899)	
would	 receive	 permission	 to	 take	 up	 tracts	 of	 indigenous	 territory	 ‘from	 time	 to	 time	 for	
settlement,	 mining,	 lumbering,	 trading	 or	 other	 purposes’.	 Leaving	 aside	 lingering	 questions	
about	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 ‘surrendering’	 interpretation	 (see	Huseman	 and	 Short	 2012),	 this	
agreement	established	the	legal,	political	and	regulatory	basis	for	the	future	development	of	the	
oil	sands	resource	within	the	boundaries	of	Treaty	8.	
	
Rapid	expansion	of	the	oil	sands	industry	began	in	the	mid‐1990s,	when	rising	global	prices	for	
conventional	oil	made	extraction	of	 the	resource	more	attractive	 to	 investors	(Chastko	2007).	
Since	 then,	 industrial	 contamination	and	encroachment	onto	Treaty	 territory	has	 reduced	 the	
quantity	and	quality	of	resources	needed	by	First	Nations	to	continue	their	traditional	land‐based	
activities	of	hunting,	fishing	and	trapping	on	the	land.	This	has	resulted	in	a	form	of	environmental	
victimisation	 known	 as	 ‘cultural	 loss’	 (Heydon,	 forthcoming)	 or,	 if	 also	 accounting	 for	 the	
institutional	 structures	 of	 settler‐colonialism,	 ‘cultural	 genocide’	 (Huseman	 and	 Short	 2012).	
Stemming	from	recognition	that	the	natural	environment	is	central	to	the	collective	identities	of	
indigenous	 peoples	 (see	 Castree	 2004),	 these	 terms	 point	 to	 those	 occasions	 in	 which	 this	
relationship	has	been	degraded	or	severed.	In	the	case	of	the	oil	sands,	they	refer	to	a	form	of	
alienation	 from	 environment	 that	 not	 only	 impedes	 the	 ability	 to	 engage	 in	 activities	
underpinning	 traditional	 land‐based	 culture	 but	 one	 which	 also	 undermines	 those	 more	
immaterial	aspects	of	collective	identity	that	physical	expression	helps	to	reproduce	(see	Heydon,	
forthcoming).	
	
While	such	experiences	have	elicited	different	intensities	of	indigenous	opposition	both	within	
and	 between	 communities	 as	 attempts	 are	 made	 to	 reach	 a	 compromise	 between	 land	
preservation	and	the	need	to	attract	capital	investment	into	their	communities	(see	Taylor	and	
Friedel	 2010),	 the	 concerns	 that	 are	 expressed	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 detrimental	 impact	 of	
extraction	on	the	hunting,	fishing	and	trapping	practices	protected	by	Treaty	rights.	Yet,	despite	
this,	there	was	no	legal	requirement	for	government	to	consult	with	First	Nations	on	proposed	
extractive	projects	until	2005,	by	which	point	oil	sands	production	had	increased	by	almost	300	
per	cent,	from	55	million	barrels	per	year	in	1995	to	160	million	(Government	of	Alberta	2018).	
During	this	period,	First	Nations	were	only	included	in	a	much	narrower	stakeholder	engagement	
processes	as	‘directly	and	adversely	affected’	persons.	This	means	that,	for	much	of	the	period	in	
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which	interest	in	extraction	of	the	oil	sands	has	existed,	First	Nations	have	had	little	say	in	where	
the	industry	should	expand,	at	what	pace	and	if	it	should	do	so	at	all.		
	
This	situation	changed	in	2005	when	oil	sands	projects	within	the	remit	of	a	Treaty	area	could	no	
longer	be	approved	before	the	proponent	had	consulted	with	First	Nations.	Known	as	the	‘duty	
to	 consult	 and	 accommodate’,	 this	 requirement	 emerged	 from	 two	 judgments	 issued	 by	 the	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	(SCC)	in	the	mid‐2000s:	Haida	Nation	v.	British	Columbia	(Minister	of	
Forests)	[2004]	3	SCR	511	(hereafter	Haida);	and	Mikisew	Cree	First	Nation	v.	Canada	(Minister	of	
Canadian	Heritage)	[2005]	3	SCR	388	(hereafter	Mikisew).	The	latter	is	most	immediately	relevant	
to	the	oil	sands	as	it	extended	the	duty	to	a	Treaty	context.	In	this	case,	the	Crown	had	intended	
to	build	a	winter	road	through	a	First	Nation	reserve,	with	 the	plan	being	 informed	by	public	
comment	only	and	not	specific	consultation	with	the	First	Nation.	Referring	directly	to	the	text	of	
Treaty	8	and	acknowledging	that	surrendered	lands	‘from	time	to	time’	could	be	‘taken	up’	for	
various	 purposes	 by	 the	 state,	 the	 SCC	 noted	 the	 absence	 of	 detail	 by	 which	 this	 process	 is	
supposed	 to	 occur.	 Deciding	 that	 ‘the	 Crown	 was	 and	 is	 expected	 to	 manage	 the	 change	
honourably’	(Mikisew	para.	31),	the	SCC	filled	this	procedural	gap	with	the	duty	to	consult	and	
accommodate.	 Triggered	when	 a	 plan	 of	 action	 risks	 adversely	 affecting	 a	 substantive	Treaty	
right,	like	the	ability	to	hunt,	fish	or	trap	on	the	land,	the	obligation	to	act	‘honourably’	requires	
the	 government	 to	 conduct	 an	 iterative	 process	 of	 consultation	 with	 the	 intention	 of	
accommodating	First	Nation	concerns	by	altering	the	original	plans	accordingly.	While	this	‘does	
not	 give	 Aboriginal	 groups	 a	 veto	 over	 what	 can	 be	 done	 with	 the	 land’	 (Haida	 para.	 48),	
‘consultation	that	excludes	from	the	outset	any	form	of	accommodation	would	be	meaningless’	
(Mikisew	para.	54).	
	
Methods	
This	case	study	is	part	of	a	larger	piece	of	research	investigating	the	criminogenic	potential	of	
‘sustainable	 development’	 in	 oil	 sands	 policy	 and	 practice	 since	 the	 mid‐1990s.	 The	 data	
presented	 here	 are	 drawn	 from	 an	 analysis	 of	 33	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 with	 senior	
personnel	 involved	 in	 the	 process	 of	 First	Nation	 consultation.	 This	was	 collected	 in	 2015	 at	
relevant	locations	in	Alberta,	including	Calgary,	Edmonton	and	Fort	McMurray.	
	
Given	 the	difficulties	 involved	 in	 accessing	powerful	 institutions	 (see	Williams	2012)	 and	 the	
need	to	gather	information	from	networks	of	actors	with	specific	knowledge	of	the	consultation	
process,	 a	 six	 month	 period	 of	 ‘relational	 groundwork’	 (Adler	 and	 Adler	 2002:	 526)	 was	
undertaken	 prior	 to	 the	 interviews	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 access.	 Once	 in	 the	 field,	 chain‐referral	
sampling	was	used	to	locate	other	appropriate	participants	(see	Penrod	et	al.	2003).	This	ensured	
a	close	alignment	between	the	interview	sample	and	the	research	questions,	which	focused	on	
tensions	within	the	consultation	process.	Widely	used	in	‘up‐system’	research,	this	method	excels	
at	 ‘identifying	 policy‐makers	 and	 specific	 elites,	 and	 understanding	 networks	 and	 processes’	
(Williams	2012:	17).	The	 interview	 transcripts	were	subject	 to	 the	specific	 stages	of	 thematic	
analysis	 outlined	 by	 Braun	 and	 Clarke	 (2006).	 This	 was	 conducted	 in	 tandem	with	 the	 data	
collection,	allowing	sampling	to	continue	until	no	new	or	deviating	data	was	being	added	to	the	
codes	 and	 categories	 of	 analysis,	 thereby	 ensuring	 its	 credibility.	 This	 is	 a	 standard	 akin	 to	
theoretical	saturation,	but	without	the	framework	of	grounded	theory	(see	Saunders	et	al.	2017).	
	
Participants	included	senior	members	of	the	Energy	Resources	Conservation	Board	(ERCB),	Land	
Use	Secretariat	(LUS),	Alberta	Energy	Regulator	(AER)	and	Aboriginal	Consultation	Office	(ACO).	
The	 first	 two	of	 these	agencies	have	more	 recently	been	consolidated	under	 the	ACO	and	are	
included	here	because	the	research	was	conducted	during	the	transition	period.	Participants	from	
the	oil	sands	 industry	(Industry)	were	also	 included,	as	were	members	 from	two	First	Nation	
Industry	Relations	Departments	(FNIRD)	local	to	the	industry.	This	latter	group	was	integral	to	
the	consultation	process,	acting	as	the	link	between	their	communities,	government	and	industry.	
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For	the	purposes	of	definition,	the	term	‘First	Nations’	here	refers	to	indigenous	groups	that	are	
signatories	to	Treaty	No.	8	of	1899.		
	
Findings	and	analysis		
Those	 interviewed	 spoke	 of	 three	 aspects	 of	 consultation	 acting	 to	 undermine	 First	 Nation	
participation:	 the	 early	 disposition	 of	 land	 leases;	 the	 delegation	 of	 consultation	 to	 industry	
proponents;	 and	 the	 premature	 determination	 of	 consultation	 ‘adequacy’	 by	 the	 ACO.	
Accompanying	 these	 issues	 were	 broader	 criticisms	 directed	 at	 features	 of	 policy	 that	 exert	
influence	 within	 the	 operational	 process	 of	 consultation.	 These	 include	 government	 use	 of	 a	
dematerialised	 concept	 of	 Treaty	 rights,	 a	 Land	Use	 Plan	 that	 excluded	 First	Nation	 input	 on	
conservation	areas,	and	two	consultation	policies	that	were	finalised	without	inclusion	of	First	
Nation	input.	Each	of	these	are	taken	in	turn.		
	
The	disposition	of	land	leases	
The	disposition	of	 land	 leases	 is	 the	 first	 stage	 in	 the	 regulatory	process	governing	 individual	
project	approvals.	This	was	also	the	earliest	point	at	which	First	Nations	directed	criticism,	noting	
that	government	agencies	dispose	of	these	leases	without	consulting	on	their	potential	impact	to	
Treaty	rights	beforehand.	This	was	reiterated	by	Participant	B	from	the	LUS,	who	also	clarified	
the	rationale	behind	Alberta’s	approach:		
	
In	some	jurisdictions	in	Canada,	at	the	issuance	of	a	 lease	stage,	there’s	actually	
consultation	with	a	First	Nation	…	because	in	their	mind	that’s	the	watermark	for	
when	the	land	becomes	taken	up.	We	say	no,	we’re	not	going	to	consult	at	the	lease	
phase	 because	 the	 company	 might	 walk	 away	 from	 the	 lease,	 they	 might	 not	
actually	do	anything	with	the	land;	we’re	not	sure	it’s	taken	up	until	the	company	
proposes	an	activity.	(Participant	B,	LUS)		
	
This	 position	 recognises	 that	 the	 conversion	 of	 land	 ‘parcels’	 into	 ‘producing	 leases’	 is	 not	
automatic,	 and	 that	 subsequent	 development	 largely	 depends	 on	 the	 success	 of	 exploration	
following	the	purchase.	However,	it	also	obscures	the	extent	to	which	the	land	disposition	process	
encourages	oil	sands	development	from	the	offset,	a	characteristic	visible	in	guidelines	governing	
the	process	by	which	industry	actors	obtain	leases.	For	instance,	Section	4	of	the	Oil	Sands	Tenure	
Regulation	 recognises	an	 ‘oil	 sands	agreement’	 to	 ‘convey	 the	exclusive	 right	 to	drill	 for,	win,	
work,	recover	and	remove	oil	sands	that	are	the	property	of	the	Crown’	(Government	of	Alberta	
2010:	11),	meaning	there	is	little	question	as	to	the	intent	of	the	lease	mechanism.	Erring	on	the	
side	 of	 non‐development	 of	 a	 land	 lease—as	 the	 interpretation	 maintained	 by	 regulatory	
personnel	does—also	ignores	the	requirement	for	purchased	parcels	to	meet	the	Minimum	Level	
of	Evaluation	outlined	in	Section	2	of	the	Oil	Sands	Tenure	Regulation.	This	requires	‘the	drilling	
of	at	least	one	evaluation	well’	prior	to	seismic	testing	(Government	of	Alberta	2010:	7‐9).	The	
lease	 disposition	mechanism	 therefore	 contains	within	 it	 a	 high	 likelihood	 that	 lands	will	 be	
changed	from	a	category	where	Treaty	rights	apply	to	one	where	they	do	not	(see	Mikisew	para.	
30),	particularly	if	compared	to	the	reduced	likelihood	of	conversion	prior	to	disposition.	
	
The	First	Nation	participants	were	particularly	critical	of	this	aspect	of	consultation,	arguing	that	
it	does	not	correspond	to	the	decisions	handed	down	by	the	SCC.	This	appears	to	be	correct.	While	
the	 Haida	 (para.	 35)	 judgment	 suggests	 that	 the	 duty	 to	 consult	 is	 triggered	 by	 evidence	
pertaining	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 adverse	 effect	 on	 Treaty	 rights,	 the	Mikisew	 (para.	 56)	 judgment	
contains	no	such	requirement	for	proof	of	a	potential	consequence.	If	taking	the	stricter	Haida	
judgment	as	the	starting	point,	consultation	is	only	triggered	‘when	the	Crown	has	knowledge,	
real	or	constructive,	of	the	potential	existence	of	the	Aboriginal	right	or	title	and	contemplates	
conduct	that	might	adversely	affect	it’	(Haida	para.	35,	emphasis	added).	The	duty	is	therefore	
not	triggered	by	an	actual	impact	on	the	substantive	component	of	Treaty	rights,	but	a	possible	
impact.	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 consultation	 should	 still	 occur	 at	 the	 point	 of	 disposition	 because	
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regulations	governing	the	process	are	weighted	in	favour	of	activities	clearly	posing	such	a	risk.	
Alternatively,	if	operating	on	the	basis	of	the	Mikisew	(para.	56)	judgment,	the	possibility	of	an	
impact	is	not	even	required.	The	Crown’s	right	to	take	up	lands	under	treaty	‘is	subject	to	its	duty	
to	consult	and,	if	appropriate,	accommodate	First	Nations’	interests	before	reducing	the	area	over	
which	their	members	may	continue	to	pursue	their	hunting,	fishing	and	trapping	rights’.	As	such,	
while	 the	granting	of	a	 lease	does	not	 in	 itself	constitute	a	process	by	which	 land	 is	rendered	
incompatible	with	Treaty	rights,	it	can	be	read	as	the	beginning	of	the	process	by	which	land	is	
altered	 in	 this	manner.	Consequently,	 the	First	Nations’	 argument	 is	 supported	by	 the	 text	 of	
either	 the	Haida	 or	Mikisew	 judgments:	 consultation	 should	be	 triggered	at	 the	point	of	 lease	
disposition.		
	
The	delegation	of	consultation	to	industry	
Following	the	process	of	granting	land	leases,	First	Nation	concerns	centred	on	the	delegation	of	
consultation	responsibility	to	industry	proponents.	A	key	contention	maintained	by	First	Nations	
is	with	regard	to	the	cumulative	environmental	impact	of	oil	sands	development	on	the	exercise	
of	their	Treaty	rights.	With	the	Crown	passing	the	majority	of	initial	consultation	responsibilities	
to	 industry	 prior	 to	 project	 approval,	 justifications	 for	 this	 delegation	 were	 based	 on	 the	
purported	expertise	held	by	companies	themselves.	As	one	government	participant	noted,	‘[a]	lot	
is	delegated	to	industry	because	in	order	to	mitigate	impacts	they’re	in	the	best	position	to	do	so’	
(Participant	C,	ACO).	Participants	from	industry	agreed,	adding	that	‘companies	are	doing	all	the	
legwork	…	that’s	accurate,	for	sure’	(Participant	A,	Industry).	However,	the	point	at	which	this	
consultation	mechanism	encounters	the	concerns	held	by	First	Nations	produces	an	obvious	and	
systemic	tension:		
	
First	Nations	cannot	broach	 issues	 to	do	with	cumulative	effects	at	 the	point	of	
consultation	with	industry,	and	government	delegates	all	of	that	to	industry.	They	
can	only	do	it,	and	deal	with	issues	like	project	emissions,	on	a	project‐by‐project	
basis.	(Participant	A,	FNIRD	1)		
	
With	consultation	delegated	to	individual	companies	and	its	scope	restricted	to	considering	the	
environmental	effects	of	individual	projects,	the	process	has	difficulty	including	issues	beyond	
this	narrow	focus.	As	such,	the	very	first	point	at	which	industry	is	required	to	consult	with	First	
Nations	 exposes	 a	 markedly	 limited	 capacity	 to	 address	 and	 accommodate	 one	 of	 their	 key	
environmental	concerns:	the	collective	impact	of	projects	on	the	surrounding	ecosystem.	This	is	
exacerbated	by	a	‘nuance’	referred	to	by	Participant	B	of	the	LUS;	that	First	Nations	are	not	simply	
concerned	about	cumulative	environmental	effects,	but	about	how	such	effects	may	impact	the	
exercise	 of	 specific	 Treaty	 rights.	 It	 therefore	 follows	 that	 not	 only	 are	 individual	 companies	
unable	to	view	even	the	first	stage	of	harm—the	cumulative	ecological	disorganisation—they	are	
also	blind	to	the	Treaty	impacts	that	result	from	its	materialisation.	Speaking	of	those	instances	
where	concerns	surrounding	cumulative	effects	are	raised	with	proponents,	Participant	A	from	
Industry	explained	that,	in	business,	‘[a]	lot	of	the	time	it’s	described	as	a	provincial	matter’.	This	
was	made	in	reference	to	the	lack	of	both	capacity	and	perceived	responsibility	for	industry	to	
address	such	concerns.		
	
The	premature	determination	of	‘adequacy’	and	dematerialisation	of	Treaty	rights	
Before	an	oil	sands	project	can	move	onto	the	next	stage	of	the	regulatory	process,	proponent	
consultation	has	to	be	deemed	adequate	by	the	ACO.	As	such,	this	agency	also	drew	criticism	from	
First	Nations	who	considered	it	to	‘only	work	at	industry’s	side’,	arguing	that	‘[t]hey	basically	see	
consultation	as	information,	or	giving	information	to	First	Nations	and	receiving	some	in	return.	
Consultation	is	a	minimal	process’	(Participant	B,	FNIRD	1).	The	First	Nations	characterised	the	
ACO	as	 ‘very	administrative’,	setting	out	 ‘a	process	which	 is	 flawed,	and	which	has	systematic	
discrimination,	where	you	can	never	actually	demonstrate	impact’	(Participant	A,	FNIRD	2).	This	
criticism	was	tied	to	the	provincial	government’s	narrow	interpretation	of	Treaty	rights.	Outlined	
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in	 its	 2005	 and	 2013	 policies	 on	 consultation	 (see	 Government	 of	 Alberta	 2005,	 2013),	 this	
underpins	the	ACO’s	minimum	standard	of	consultation	by	setting	out	the	content	of	said	rights	
in	light	of	SCC	judgments.	The	basic	divergence	of	FNIRD	and	government	views	was	summarised	
by	Participant	C	within	the	ACO,	where	‘First	Nations	believe	Treaty	rights	is	to	a	broad	suite	of	
things,	whereas	Alberta	believes	the	right	only	extends	to	hunt,	fish	and	trap	for	food’.	However,	
Participant	A	from	FNIRD	2	expanded	on	this,	describing	how,	beyond	the	food	restriction,	the	
lack	 of	 policy	 detail	 provides	 a	 space	 in	which	 the	ACO	 can	 operationalise	 an	 even	 narrower	
interpretation:		
	
Alberta	states	that	 the	Aboriginal	and	Treaty	rights	 to	 fish,	hunt	and	trap	is	not	
pegged	to	any	site‐specific	location.	So	it’s	more	about	the	right	to	hunt	as	opposed	
to	the	right	to	hunt	on	that	little	plot	over	there	…	or	the	plot	across	the	river.	Those	
are	not	protected,	but	it’s	about	your	ability	and	right	to	do	it	somewhere	out	on	
the	landscape.	And	recently	I	got	a	letter	from	the	Aboriginal	Consultation	Office	
that	reaffirmed	also	that	not	only	is	it	not	site‐specific,	but	your	right	to	hunt	is	not	
species‐specific.	And	so	a	good	question	would	be,	what	does	that	mean?	Because	
they’ve	not	actually	said	that	in	writing	before.	What	that	would	mean	to	me	is	that	
Alberta	is	looking	at	protecting	First	Nations’	rights	to	hunt,	fish	and	trap	on	the	
landscape,	 but	 not	 guarantee	 any	 specific	 location,	 and	 not	 guaranteeing	 that	
there’ll	be	a	certain	species	or	abundance	of	a	certain	quality	in	a	certain	area.	So	
that,	of	course,	is	a	direct	opposite	interpretation	about	how	First	Nations	view	it,	
because	…	our	interpretation	of	Aboriginal	Treaty	rights	are	to	all	parts	of	the	land	
…	So	that	interpretation	is	really	at	the	opposite	ends	of	the	scale	of	how	you	look	
at	what	a	[Treaty]	right	is.	
	
In	 restricting	 Treaty	 rights	 to	 subsistence	 practices,	 and	 divorcing	 them	 from	 the	 material	
quantity	 and	quality	of	 resources	underpinning	 their	 execution,	 the	ACO	 is	operationalising	 a	
diluted	conception	that	is	at	odds	with	SCC	judgments.	Interpreting	Treaty	rights	to	hunt,	fish	and	
trap	on	the	land	as	only	for	food	does	not	accord	with	Mikisew,	which	states	that	hunting,	fishing	
and	trapping	practices	‘cannot	be	isolated	from	the	Treaty	as	a	whole,	but	must	be	read	in	the	
context	of	its	underlying	purpose,	as	intended	by	both	the	Crown	and	the	First	Nations	peoples’	
(Mikisew	para.	29,	emphasis	added).	With	 this	 ‘underlying	purpose’	 referencing	the	assurance	
that	the	‘same	means	of	earning	a	livelihood	would	continue	after	the	treaty	as	existed	before	it’	
(Mikisew	 para.	 30,	 emphasis	 added),	 and	 considering	 that	 ‘a	 large	 element	 of	 the	 Treaty	 8	
negotiations	were	the	assurances	of	continuity	in	traditional	patterns	of	economic	activity	…	and	
occupation’	 (Mikisew	 para.	 47,	 emphasis	 added),	 Treaty	 rights	 should	 be	 interpreted	 as	 the	
guarantee	 of	 a	 continuation	 of	 this	 ‘livelihood’.	 Recognising	 this,	 Laidlaw	 and	 Passelac‐Ross	
(2014:	25)	go	on	to	note	that	‘[t]his	is	the	proper	interpretation	of	Alberta’s	numbered	Treaties’,	
where	‘livelihood	was	and	remains	interwoven	in	the	distinctive	cultures	of	Alberta	First	Nations’.	
Treaty	rights	should	therefore	be	taken	to	encompass	a	much	broader	suite	of	purposes	beyond	
hunting,	 fishing	 and	 trapping	 for	 food.	 The	Mikisew	 case	 (para.	 44),	 also	 suggests	 that	Treaty	
rights	should	be	interpreted	as	both	species‐	and	location‐specific,	requiring	that	these	be	taken	
into	account	when	determining	factors	that	trigger	the	duty	to	consult.	Indeed,	the	West	Moberly	
First	Nations	v.	British	Columbia	(Chief	Inspector	of	Mines)	2011	(para.	138)	describes	the	Mikisew	
case	as	‘instructive	on	this	point’.	As	such,	First	Nation	criticisms	highlight	a	very	real	discrepancy	
between	the	approach	adopted	by	the	ACO	towards	Treaty	rights	and	the	judgments	of	the	SCC.		
	
Marginalisation	at	the	level	of	land	use	strategy	
Criticism	was	also	directed	by	participants	at	the	level	of	policy	and	strategy,	which	influence	the	
more	 operational	 aspects	 of	 the	 consultation	process.	One	of	 the	key	 issues	 identified	was	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 Lower	Athabasca	Regional	 Plan	 (LARP),	 a	 land	use	 strategy	 intended	 to	 guide	
development	in	the	region	of	the	oil	sands.	Of	specific	focus	was	its	omission	of	First	Nation	input	
on	conservation	areas,	parcels	of	land	where	development	would	be	prohibited	but	which	could	
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continue	 on	 adjacent	 areas.	 Indeed,	 this	 is	 an	 example	 of	 First	 Nations	 conceding	 that	 some	
industrialisation	would	be	of	benefit,	demonstrating	an	attempt	to	balance	their	own	traditional,	
land‐based	practices	with	the	need	for	wage	labour.	As	such,	during	consultation,	evidence‐based	
recommendations	 were	 submitted	 as	 to	 the	 location	 of	 these	 areas,	 their	 size,	 proximity	 to	
communities	on	traditional	territories,	and	suitability	for	supporting	the	surrounding	ecosystem	
to	ensure	the	continuation	of	activities	tied	to	Treaty	rights.	However,	the	result	of	this	costly	and	
time‐consuming	exercise	was	the	almost	complete	exclusion	of	First	Nation	inputs,	which	were	
subordinated	 to	 the	 economic	 value	 of	 oil	 sand	 deposits:	 ‘the	 major	 driver	 for	 deciding	
conservation	areas,	that	had	to	be	considered	at	the	table	with	Alberta,	was	location	of	resources’	
(Participant	A,	FNIRD	2).	The	primacy	of	economic	reasoning	underpinning	such	decisions	was	
confirmed	by	Participant	B	from	the	LUS:		
	
…	if	you	look	at	the	leases	that	have	been	sold	by	the	Department	of	Energy	on	that	
landscape,	then	you	look	at	the	regional	plan	and	the	conservation	areas	that	have	
been	set	out	…	it	probably	doesn’t	take	a	rocket	scientist	to	figure	out	where	the	
conserved	land	was	in	relation	to	the	economic	driver,	right?	
	
Figure	 1	 clearly	 supports	 this	 view,	 with	 the	 map	 on	 the	 left	 indicating	 conservation	 areas	
requested	by	a	First	Nation	during	consultation	on	the	LARP	and,	on	the	right,	those	that	were	
ultimately	approved.	The	areas	in	grey	denote	recoverable	oil	sands	deposit.	Although	initially	
appearing	that	some	minor	concessions	were	made	here	by	the	provincial	government,	this	 is	
incorrect.	The	shaded	area	marked	‘1’	is	the	Birch	Mountains	Wildland	Provincial	Park	and	those	
marked	‘2’	form	the	Marguerite	River	Wildland	Provincial	Park,	both	of	which	were	established	
in	2000	under	the	Provincial	Parks	Act,	creation	of	which	had	nothing	to	do	with	consultation	on	
the	LARP	(Griffiths	et	al.	2001:	7).		
	
	(a) 																																																																																						(b)																																																																																				
	
Figure	1:	Requested	conservation	areas	(a)	vs.	granted	conservation	areas	(b)	
Source:		Nishi	et	al.	2013:	50‐51	
	
Notes:	 Conservation	areas	requested	by	a	First	Nation	during	consultation	on	the	LARP	shaded	red	in	(a).	
Ultimately	approved	areas	shaded	green	in	(b);	area	‘1’	is	Birch	Mountains	Wildland	Provincial	Park;	area	‘2’	
is	Marguerite	River	Wildland	Provincial	Park.	
Recoverable	oil	sands	deposits	shaded	grey	in	(a)	and	(b).	
	
Ultimately,	 although	 the	 Government	 of	 Alberta	 have	 established	 some	 conservation	 areas	
following	consultation	with	First	Nations	(see	Government	of	Alberta	2012:	92‐93),	these	have	
been	primarily	granted	at	locations	not	intersecting	with	the	oil	sands	deposit.	Put	another	way,	
the	interests	of	First	Nations	have	been	subordinated	to	a	perception	of	oil	sands	as	the	priority	
source	of	value	in	the	region.		
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Marginalisation	at	the	level	of	consultation	policy	
Although	the	ACO	attracted	considerable	criticism,	their	approach	is	dictated	by	the	2013	policy	
on	consultation.	Despite	a	broad	range	of	participants	recognising	that	the	narrow	interpretation	
of	 Treaty	 rights	 is	 rooted	 in	 this	 policy,	 this	 was	 frequently	 accompanied	 by	 concurrent	
recognition	 that	 the	 policy	 was	 finalised	 without	 adequate	 integration	 of	 First	 Nation	 input.	
Indeed,	engagement	with	First	Nations	on	both	the	2005	and	2013	policies	bear	similarity	to	the	
consultation	process	deployed	in	development	of	the	LARP,	in	that	they	both	excluded	substantial	
proportions	of	indigenous	input:		
	
So,	we	came	out	with	our	first	policy	in	2005,	we	came	out	with	our	next	policy	in	
2013.	The	first	one	didn’t	work,	wasn’t	supported	by	First	Nations,	so	we	kind	of	
scratched	our	head;	okay	what	did	we	get	wrong?	We	asked	them,	let’s	talk	about	
that.	[They	said]	‘Well,	you	didn’t	engage	us	the	way	we	wanted	to	be	engaged’.	So,	
in	2008	we	went	into	a	policy	review	that	took	years,	and	we	engaged	one	to	one	
with	each	community,	but	it	was	the	same	model.	Go	out	and	look	for	it,	seek	input,	
and	then	bring	it	back	and	see	what	you	can	come	up	with.	We	did	that	 for	this	
policy;	still	not	supported.	(Participant	A,	ACO)		
	
This	approach	was	not	only	recognised	in	specific	relation	to	Alberta’s	consultation	policy	but	
was	 also	 viewed	 as	 characteristic	 of	 the	province’s	 approach	 to	 consulting	with	 First	Nations	
more	generally,	a	feature	which	is	dictated	by	these	underpinning	policies	on	consultation:		
	
The	push	back	…	not	just	for	First	Nations	but	for	Aboriginal	Peoples	in	general,	is	
government	like	to	come	out	and	say	‘hey,	this	is	what	we’re	doing,	tell	us	what	you	
think’,	and	then	they	go	back	and	write	out	their	policy	and	their	paper	and	they’ve	
never	included	a	single	thing	of	what	they’ve	heard.	(Participant	D,	AER)		
	
What	we’ve	traditionally	done	is	we’ll	say	‘okay,	we’re	going	to	develop	a	policy	
around	this	and	we’ll	go	consult	and	we’ll	gather	up	this	information	input,	from	
Aboriginal	communities	and	other	stakeholders,	and	we’ll	take	it	back,	dissect	it	
and	analyse	it,	come	up	with	something	and	then	put	it	back	out	and	say,	you	know,	
here’s	our	policy,	thanks	for	the	input’.	The	reality	 is	that	 it	doesn’t	work	 in	the	
Aboriginal	context.	I’ve	never	seen	it	work	and	I’ve	been	doing	this	work	now	for	
over	a	decade.	It	just	doesn’t	work.	(Participant	A,	ACO)	
	
Ultimately,	the	situation	experienced	by	First	Nations,	with	regard	to	their	input	into	both	the	
2005	and	2013	policies	on	consultation,	is	one	characterised	by	repeated	marginalisation.	Over	a	
decade	may	have	passed	since	the	duty	to	consult	was	enshrined	in	law,	but	the	lack	of	progress	
made	during	this	time	only	lends	further	support	to	a	comment	made	by	one	of	the	First	Nation	
participants:	‘[i]t’s	an	attitudinal	change	that’s	required;	the	attitude	of	government	to	the	duty	
to	consult	[and]	Treaty	rights.	They	pay	lip	service	to	consultation’	(Participant	B,	FNIRD	1).	
	
Discussion	
The	distributional	injustice	experienced	by	First	Nations	for	almost	two	decades,	in	the	form	of	
‘cultural	 loss’,	 is	 facilitated	by	a	 consultation	process	 characterised	by	 the	 core	 features	of	 its	
procedural	 counterpart;	 marginalisation	 and	 misrecognition.	 Taking	 the	 first	 of	 these	
components	 as	 a	 point	 of	 departure,	 First	 Nations	 are	 excluded	 at	 key	 stages.	 At	 the	 very	
beginning,	 land	 has	 already	 been	 divided	 up	 amongst	 oil	 industry	 proponents	 by	 the	 time	
consultation	 is	 required	by	 the	ACO.	First	Nation	 input	 is	 therefore	gathered	 too	 late	 for	 it	 to	
influence	project	placement.	This	is	despite	procedural	Treaty	rights	requiring	that	consultation	
be	triggered	at	this	earlier	point	and	not	after.	First	Nations	are	acknowledged	at	a	subsequent	
stage	but	the	marginalisation	continues,	as	they	are	discouraged	from	raising	concerns	about	the	
cumulative	effects	of	oil	sand	projects.	Even	when	these	issues	are	broached,	industry	refuse	to	
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acknowledge	them	because	the	LARP	is	seen	as	the	solution.	However,	even	this	overarching	land	
use	plan	excluded	indigenous	input	prior	to	its	publication,	where	the	economic	value	of	the	oil	
sands	 resource	 was	 given	 priority	 over	 First	 Nation	 interests.	 Several	 markers	 of	 the	
participatory	element	of	procedural	injustice	are	thereby	demonstrated,	including	the	exclusion	
of	‘non‐elite’	voices	at	key	points	of	the	process	(Walker	2012),	opportunity	for	only	a	narrow	
field	of	review	(Hunold	and	Young	1998),	the	refusal	to	acknowledge	issues	raised	by	those	who	
are	included	(George	and	Reed	2017),	and	a	lack	of	accommodation	that	reduces	consultation	to	
‘an	empty	ritual	of	participation’	(Arnstein	1969:	216).	
	
Although	an	injustice	in	and	of	itself,	this	marginalisation	is	accompanied	by	an	equally	systemic	
misrecognition	of	First	Nation	Treaty	 rights.	This	occurs	where	 the	ACO	uses	 its	discretion	 to	
evacuate	them	of	their	materiality,	and	where	it	limits	the	right	to	hunt,	fish	and	trap	to	food	only.	
While	at	first	appearing	to	be	more	a	question	of	law	than	justice,	this	is	not	so,	largely	because	
the	two	spheres	are	entwined	when	discussing	First	Nations.	This	accords	with	the	conceiving	of	
recognition	 as	 a	 remedy	 for	 injustice,	 where	 Fraser	 (2001)	 was	 careful	 to	 sensitise	 it	 to	 the	
distinctive	status	or	 rights	of	specific	groups.	This	 is	because	 the	 forms	required	 in	any	given	
instance	depend	on	the	types	of	misrecognition	to	be	redressed:	
	
In	cases	where	misrecognition	 involves	denying	 the	common	humanity	of	some	
participants,	 the	 remedy	 is	 universalist	 recognition	 …	 Where,	 in	 contrast,	
misrecognition	 involves	denying	 some	participants’	 distinctiveness,	 the	 remedy	
could	be	recognition	of	specificity.	(Fraser	2001:	30)	
	
Not	only	does	this	acknowledge	that	the	recognition	needs	of	subordinated	actors	differ	to	those	
of	 dominant	 actors,	 it	 also	 appreciates	 that	 addressing	 such	 differences	 may	 be	 required	 to	
overcome	 obstacles	 to	 injustice.	 In	 this	 sense,	 to	 address	 unequal	 participation	 in	 decision‐
making,	some	groups	‘may	need	to	have	hitherto	under	acknowledged	distinctiveness	taken	into	
account’	(Fraser	2001:	31).		
	
For	First	Nations,	this	specificity	is	demonstrated	through	their	cultural	identity	or	‘indigeneity’	
(see	Wolfe	1999),	of	which	Treaty	rights	are	a	legal	expression.	If	‘culture’	is	recognised	as	‘the	
set	of	distinctive	 spiritual,	material,	 intellectual	and	emotional	 features	of	a	society	or	a	social	
group’,	 encompassing	 ‘art	 and	 literature,	 lifestyles,	 ways	 of	 living	 together,	 value	 systems,	
traditions	 and	 beliefs’	 (UNESCO	 2001:	 1,	 emphasis	 added),	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 indigenous	
peoples	lies	in	their	cultural	relationship	with	the	land.	As	Woolford	(2009:	91)	describes	it,	their	
conceptions	 of	 nature	 and	 culture	 are	 ‘braided’	 to	 one	 another,	 representing	 not	 simply	 a	
‘closeness’	or	reliance	upon	nature,	but	an	‘embodied	inscription’,	where	land	and	wildlife	form	a	
central	 component	 to	 their	 collective	 indigenous	 identities.	 This	 still	 underpins	 the	 cultural	
identity	of	First	Nations	 in	and	around	 the	oil	 sands	 today.	Their	 indigeneity	 is	 ‘reflected	and	
embedded	in	practices	…	between	people	and	their	natural	environment’	(Gibson	2017:	8).	As	
McCormack	 (2012:	 125)	 explains,	 ‘history,	 culture	 and	 religion	 are	 both	 encoded	 and	
demonstrated	in	the	geography	of	their	traditional	territory’.	Hunting,	fishing	and	trapping	rights	
stand	as	 testament	 to	 this.	They	are	a	 legal	expression	of	 the	 indigenous	will	 to	protect	 these	
specific,	 land‐based	practices	across	generations.	As	such,	the	misrecognition	demonstrated	in	
the	narrow	and	diluted	interpretation	of	Treaty	rights	is	not	a	matter	of	illegality	or	injustice,	but	
illegality	and	injustice.	This	echoes	the	point	made	by	George	and	Reed	(2017),	where	the	lack	of	
special	 consideration	 given	 to	 adversely	 affected	 and	 previously	 marginalised	 groups	 is	 a	
hallmark	of	misrecognition‐as‐injustice.		
	
While	marginalisation	and	misrecognition	are	manifested	at	different	points	in	the	consultation	
process,	this	belies	a	far	more	iterative	and	entwined	relationship	between	the	two	components.	
Both	 the	2013	and	2005	policies	on	consultation	grant	 the	ACO	enough	discretion	 to	abstract	
hunting,	 fishing	 and	 trapping	 practices	 from	 the	 material	 environment.	 This	 enables	 the	
government	agency	to	make	a	determination	of	‘adequacy’	at	a	point	prior	to	which	indigenous	
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concerns	 can	 be	 addressed.	 Yet,	 each	 of	 these	 consultation	 policies	 were	 devised	 with	 little	
accommodation	of	First	Nation	input.	As	such,	indigenous	voices	are	not	only	marginalised	at	the	
level	of	project‐by‐project	consultation	due	to	a	narrow	interpretation	of	Treaty	rights,	but	this	is	
also	 facilitated	 by	 their	 previous,	 higher	 level	 marginalisation	 on	 the	 provincial	 consultation	
policies	that	inform	it.	The	same	observation	can	be	made	about	the	LARP,	which	allows	for	the	
similar	marginalisation	of	indigenous	concerns	pertaining	to	cumulative	environmental	effects.	
However,	by	virtue	of	their	procedural	Treaty	rights,	which	are	tied	to	the	distinctiveness	of	First	
Nations,	such	marginalisation	is	also	a	form	of	misrecognition.	Simply	put,	this	is	because	their	
marginalisation	simultaneously	misrecognises	their	procedural	right	not	to	be	marginalised.	In	
this	sense,	the	two	components	of	procedural	injustice	systematically	and	cyclically	reinforce	one	
another	at	different	levels,	restricting	meaningful	First	Nation	involvement	in	decision‐making	
and	generating	the	distributional	injustice	of	cultural	loss.		
	
Conclusion		
In	response	to	the	distributional	conception	of	environmental	justice	deployed	throughout	green	
criminology,	 this	 article	 has	 demonstrated	 how	 its	 procedural	 counterpart	 can	 be	 used	 to	
examine	 the	 decision‐making	 processes	 underpinning	 such	 distributions.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 has	
sought	 to	clarify	how	 justice‐as‐recognition	and	 justice‐as‐participation	are	 jointly	manifested	
within	the	concept	of	procedural	environmental	justice.	By	applying	this	to	the	process	of	First	
Nation	consultation	that	occurs	on	oil	sands	projects	in	Alberta,	Canada,	the	article	also	adds	to	
existing	 literature	 on	 this	 specific	 case.	 Showing	 how	 the	 two	 components	 of	 procedural	
injustice—marginalisation	and	misrecognition—reinforce	each	other	at	the	levels	of	operations	
and	 policy,	 the	 article	 illustrates	 how	 the	 resulting	 dismissal	 of	 First	 Nation	 distinctiveness	
underpins	the	distributional	injustice	of	‘cultural	loss’	experienced.	In	doing	so,	it	also	expands	
on	existing	macro‐level	accounts	of	environmental	harm	in	the	region	by	explaining	the	role	of	
provincial	regulatory	mechanisms	in	its	production	and	reproduction.		
	
The	implications	pertain	to	both	the	case	itself	and	green	criminology.	With	regard	to	the	former,	
politicians	 in	 Alberta	 should	 reassess	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Treaty	 rights	 outlined	 in	 existing	
consultation	policy.	Aligning	it	with	those	of	First	Nations	and	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	would	
contribute	to	a	reduction	in	procedural	and	distributional	injustice,	also	pre‐empting	a	possible	
challenge	in	the	courts,	of	which	it	is	currently	vulnerable.	Further	research	is	also	needed	on	the	
dematerialised	 interpretation	of	Treaty	 rights,	as	 it	 is	not	 rooted	 in	policy.	Borne	of	 the	more	
operational	 realm,	 more	 information	 is	 needed	 on	 how	 its	 use	 is	 justified	 by	 the	 regulatory	
personnel	responsible	for	operationalising	it.	With	regard	to	green	criminology	more	broadly,	it	
would	be	fruitful	for	future	research	to	explore	other	instances	of	procedural	injustice.	This	would	
render	the	sub‐field	more	attentive	to	operational	dynamics	that	are	unjust	in	and	of	themselves,	
as	well	as	those	serving	to	produce	more	distributional	forms	of	environmental	injustice.	
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